Electoral Interference

How and why armed groups undermine Colombia's elections

Armed members of the ELN: larazon.es

On the night of May 15th, 2026, Rogers Devia, the former mayor of Cubarral, Meta serving as a campaign worker for right-wing Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo De La Espriella, was travelling from Villavicencio to Alto Ariari when he and one of his staffers were intercepted by four hooded men on motorcycles. According to De La Espriella’s campaign, the men searched Devia and his staffer’s belongings and, upon discovering campaign materials, “opened fire,” killing them both.

Less than 12-hours earlier in the same municipality, armed men fired upon a vehicle transporting Julian Cardona, a former mayoral candidate in Cubarral and campaign staffer of right-wing senator and presidential candidate Paloma Valencia. Fortunately, because his vehicle was armored, Cardona escaped unharmed.

Four days later, on May 19th, Colombian Senator Alexander Lopez was leaving a campaign event promoting leftist senator and presidential candidate Ivan Cepeda, his ally, in Popayan, Cauca, when his security detail was attacked by armed men on the road to Cali. During the attack, the men intercepted “various vehicles” from the detail and shot at the Senator’s armored SUV. Fortunately, Senator Lopez was not in the vehicle at the time, having elected to travel with fellow congressman Kevin Gomez “to discuss some political matters,” and he managed to arrive in Cali safely.

Vehicle of Julian Cardona following the attack in Meta: periodicomilenioacasias.com

With events such as these and the assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe last year, Colombia’s 2026 elections have been its most violent in a decade. Driving this violence is the growing strength and boldness of Colombia’s various armed groups. However, rifle bursts are not the only means they have to attack Colombia’s democratic process.

Reports in various regions of Colombia allege that armed groups have attempted to undermine the election by coercing, pressuring, or bribing residents to vote for specific candidates and by spreading disinformation, sometimes with the aid of artificial intelligence. In other cases, voters have reported drone attacks against or near polling stations or expressed concern that armed groups could seize, alter, or destroy ballots, discouraging them from voting at all.

Today, observers warn that democracy is at risk in approximately one third of all Colombian municipalities, with 139 of them facing “extreme risks,” particularly in the country’s rural regions. To secure the election, the Colombian government has announced the deployment of approximately 250,000 soldiers to protect ballots and polling stations throughout the country.

It’s tempting to look at armed group activity around elections and see it as an attempt to promote or sabotage a specific candidate or party. Conservatives allege that armed groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and remnants of the FARC seek to help leftist Ivan Cepeda win the presidency. Meanwhile, other groups such as the Gaitanista Army (EGC) may instead favor a right winger with ties to Colombia’s violent paramilitaries like Paloma Valencia or Abelardo De La Espriella. However, this narrative obscures the reality that armed groups benefit more from instability and state weakness than who is in office. The armed groups’ primary goal is to undermine the elections themselves and Colombians’ confidence in them. If a politically convenient candidate happens to win, that’s just the cherry on top.

Next week, Armed Groups of Colombia will analyze the ongoing war between FARC remnants in Guaviare.

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